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ANIMALS—REGULATION—SEARCHES, SEIZURES, INSPECTIONS 
AND FORFEITURES 
IN RE PETERSON’S DOGS 
In In re Peterson’s Dogs,1 Lila Peterson appealed the district court’s 
order finding she could not care for her dogs and ordering the State not to 
return the animals to her.2  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court’s order, holding the State had probable cause to confiscate the 
dogs and the district court did not err in concluding Peterson could not 
provide adequate care for them.3 
On February 7, 2008, Deputy Sheriff James Hulm visited Peterson’s 
home in response to a report of possible animal abuse.4  Peterson showed 
Hulm the basement where she raised Chihuahua dogs.5  She also allowed 
Hulm to take pictures of the area.6  On March 1, 2008, Hulm returned to 
Peterson’s home, this time accompanied by a number of deputy sheriffs and 
Central Humane Society employees.7  Together, they removed forty-seven 
dogs from Peterson’s home.8 
At the time of confiscation, Hulm provided Peterson with two forms—
a relinquishment of ownership form and a “Notice of Confiscation” form.9  
The relinquishment of ownership form effectively waived any future claims 
to the Chihuahuas.10  The “Notice of Confiscation” form, on the other hand, 
stated Peterson had five days to claim the dogs.11  Peterson signed both 
forms during the confiscation on March 1, 2008.12  Five days later, on 
March 6, 2008, Peterson contacted the sheriff’s department demanding the 
dogs be returned to her or, in the alternative, demanding a court hearing to 
challenge the validity of the dogs’ confiscation.13 
Following Peterson’s request, the district court scheduled a hearing.14  
The State moved for a cancellation of the hearing, asserting Peterson had 
 
1. 2009 ND 206, 776 N.W.2d 52. 
2. Peterson’s Dogs, ¶ 1, 776 N.W.2d at 53. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6, 776 N.W.2d at 53-54. 
5. Id. ¶ 2, 776 N.W.3d at 53. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. ¶ 3. 
10. Id. 
11. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 54. 
12. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 53. 
13. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 54. 
14. Id. ¶ 4. 
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waived her right to a hearing when she signed the relinquishment of owner-
ship form.15  The district court granted the State’s motion, and Peterson 
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.16  The supreme court held the 
district court erred in cancelling the hearing and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.17 
Accordingly, the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing to 
determine if Peterson had voluntarily relinquished her rights to the dogs.18  
The district court found the two forms Hulm provided to Peterson were 
conflicting and concluded that, given the conflicting nature of the forms, 
Peterson did not voluntarily relinquish the dogs to the sheriff’s depart-
ment.19  Next, the district court considered whether Peterson was capable of 
providing adequate care for the dogs.20  The district court heard the testi-
mony from five individuals on the matter.21 
First, the district court heard from Deputy Sheriff Hulm who testified 
his visit to Peterson’s home revealed:  Peterson had over sixty dogs in only 
two kennels; the dogs had no way to enter or exit the kennels; and the ken-
nels had no food or water in them.22  The district court then heard testimony 
from two individuals who assisted Hulm in confiscating the dogs on March 
1, 2008.23  The first individual testified “the dogs were not exposed to cold 
or inclement weather[,]” and food and water were readily available to 
them.24  The other individual testified “one mother chihuahua appeared 
dehydrated and several puppies needed supplemental feeding.”25  The 
individual also testified she observed a spaniel, with numerous bite wounds, 
that appeared to be malnourished, and the individual found Peterson’s base-
ment to be too dark and too small for raising that number of dogs.26  In her 
testimony, Peterson stated she was raising seventy-five dogs in her base-
ment and explained she provided food and water and cleaned the dogs’ 
kennels three times a day.27  The last witness, the president of the Bismarck 
 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. ¶ 5. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. ¶¶ 6-9, 776 N.W.2d at 54-55. 
22. Id. ¶ 6, 776 N.W.2d at 54. 
23. Id. ¶ 7. 
24. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 54-55. 
25. Id., 776 N.W.2d at 55. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. ¶ 8. 
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Kennel Club, testified his examination of Peterson’s basement revealed the 
environment was “perfectly satisfactory for Chihuahuas.”28 
After the hearing, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and 
order, finding Peterson’s basement was too small and not clean enough for 
raising seventy-five dogs.29  Thus, the district court concluded Peterson 
could not adequately care for the dogs and ordered the State not to return 
the dogs to her care.30  Peterson appealed, arguing the State lacked probable 
cause to confiscate the dogs.31  The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, 
explaining under section 36-21.1-06(1) of the North Dakota Century Code, 
“Any sheriff, police officer, licensed veterinarian, or investigator may take 
custody of and care for any animal unjustly exposed to cold or inclement 
weather or not properly fed or watered.”32  Based on the observations of 
Deputy Sheriff Hulm and another individual present during the confisca-
tion, the State had probable cause to confiscate the animals on the ground 
Peterson did not properly feed or water the dogs.33 
After determining the State had probable cause to confiscate the dogs, 
the supreme court recognized the State was required to notify Peterson she 
had five days to redeem her dogs following the confiscation.34  However, 
before the State could return the dogs to Peterson, the district court had ten 
days to determine whether Peterson could provide adequate care for the 
animals.35  The district court found Peterson was not capable of adequately 
caring for the dogs and ordered the State not to return the dogs to her care.36  
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s finding, 
applying a clearly erroneous standard of review.37 
On appeal, Peterson argued section 36-21.1-06(8) required the district 
court to determine whether Peterson could provide adequate care for her 
dogs, rather than whether she had provided adequate care in the past.38  The 
supreme court agreed with Peterson’s interpretation of the relevant statutory 
language, but explained the section did not “preclude district courts from 
considering evidence of an owner’s past care” in determining an owner’s 
 
28. Id. ¶ 9. 
29. Id. ¶ 10. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. ¶ 11. 
32. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-06(1) (2009)). 
33. Id. ¶ 12, 776 N.W.2d. at 56. 
34. Id. ¶ 13 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-06(1), (3)). 
35. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 36-21.1-06(8)). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. ¶ 14 (citing Aasmunstad v. State, 2008 ND 206, ¶ 16, 763 N.W.2d 748, 756-57). 
38. Id. ¶ 15. 
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ability to adequately care for animals.39  The supreme court further explain-
ed while there was testimony in the record to support a finding Peterson had 
adequately cared for her dogs in the past, there was also testimony estab-
lishing Peterson could not care for the dogs if they were returned to her.40  
Because a district court’s choice between two permissible views does not 
constitute clear error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s order, concluding the district court’s findings were not clearly 
erroneous.41 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 776 N.W.2d at 56-57. 
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CIVIL COMMITMENTS—SEXUALLY DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS 
IN RE VOISINE 
In In re Voisine,42 Raymond J. Voisine appealed his commitment to the 
care, custody, and control of the Department of Human Services after a dis-
trict court found him a sexually dangerous individual.43  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order, holding the district court 
erred in concluding incest between consenting adults constituted sexually 
predatory conduct, and for failing to make specific findings on two prongs 
of the test for sexually dangerous individuals.44 
In 2003, an officer searched Voisine’s apartment for firearms.45  Dur-
ing the search, the officer found sexually explicit photographs of Voisine’s 
daughter under his pillow.46  After an investigation, it was established 
Voisine had fathered two children with his daughter.47  Furthermore, inter-
views with Voisine’s family members revealed Voisine had engaged in 
sexual acts with one of his grandsons who was six or seven years old at the 
time.48  The State subsequently charged Voisine with gross sexual imposi-
tion for the sexual contact with his grandson.49  Voisine pleaded guilty to 
the charge and was incarcerated until his release in 2008.50 
Following Voisine’s release, the State petitioned the district court to 
commit him as a sexually dangerous individual.51  In support of its petition, 
the State asserted Voisine had three children with two of his daughters, 
abused his children when they were minors, and promoted obscenity to his 
minor grandson.52  Voisine denied the allegations, but the district court 
found probable cause to detain him.53  The district court also scheduled a 
commitment hearing.54  At the hearing, expert reports on whether Voisine 
was a sexually dangerous individual were presented and considered by the 
district court.55  Based on the evidence, the district court found the incest 
between Voisine and his daughters to be sexually predatory conduct and 
 
42. 2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908. 
43. Voisine, ¶ 1, 777 N.W.2d at 909. 
44. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 909-10. 
45. Id. ¶ 2, 777 N.W.2d at 910. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. ¶ 3. 
49. Id. ¶ 4. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. ¶ 5. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. ¶ 6. 
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concluded Voisine was likely to engage in such conduct again.56  Accord-
ingly, the district court ordered Voisine committed to the care, custody, and 
control of the Department of Human Services.57 
Voisine appealed the district court’s order, arguing the court erred in 
applying the sexually dangerous individual analysis.58  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court stated in commitment proceedings, the State bears the bur-
den of showing by clear and convincing evidence the individual has: 
[1] engaged in sexually predatory conduct . . . [2] has a . . . 
condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality dis-
order, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that [3] makes that 
individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory 
conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health 
or safety of others.59 
The Supreme Court further explained the North Dakota Century Code 
defines “sexually predatory conduct” as “engaging or attempting to engage 
in a sexual act or contact with another” through the application of force, 
threat of force, or the use of intoxicants.60  In addition, when the victim is 
unaware of the sexual contact, is under the age of fifteen, or has a mental 
disability that prevents the victim from understanding the nature of the act, 
and the actor is aware of it, the actor has engaged in sexually predatory 
conduct.61  Finally, the court noted the statute also defines as sexually 
predatory any sexual contact between a minor victim and an adult actor, 
including the situation when the actor is also the parent of the victim.62  
However, the court stated, although morally and criminally reprehensible, 
incest between consenting adults does not fall within the statutory definition 
of sexually predatory conduct.63 
In ordering Voisine committed, the district court determined the 
incestuous contact between him and his daughters constituted sexually 
predatory conduct and was a breach of his parental duties.64  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court held the district court’s findings were clearly erro-
neous because incest between consenting adults is not sexually predatory.65  
Moreover, because the identification of the sexually predatory conduct 
 
56. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 910-11. 
57. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 910. 
58. Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 777 N.W.2d at 911. 
59. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2009)). 
60. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(9) (2009)). 
61. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 911-12. 
62. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 912. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. ¶ 11. 
65. Id. 
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plays a role in each step of the sexually dangerous individual analysis, the 
district court’s erroneous view of the law likely affected its conclusion 
Voisine was a sexually dangerous individual.66  The court explained 
although Voisine’s sexual contact with his grandson could have satisfied 
the first prong of the analysis, the district court’s failure to make specific 
findings about the prong, other than those related to the incestuous conduct, 
was a legal error.67  The court also concluded the district court erred in the 
second prong of the analysis by failing to make any findings about 
Voisine’s sexual, personality, or mental disorder.68  Finally, the supreme 
court stated the district court properly relied on Voisine’s prior behavior 
and on the experts’ reports presented at the commitment hearing in 
determining Voisine was likely to engage in future acts of sexually 
predatory conduct.69  However, because the district court erred in finding 
incest between consenting adults was sexually predatory conduct and failed 
to make specific findings as to the first and second prong of the sexually 
dangerous individual analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed 
the commitment order and remanded for further proceedings.70 
 
66. Id. 
67. Id. ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d at 912-13. 
68. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 913. 
69. Id. ¶ 14. 
70. Id. ¶ 15. 
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CIVIL PROCEDURE—POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
PROCEEDINGS—MOTIONS 
DELVO V. STATE 
In Delvo v. State,71 Jessica Delvo appealed the district court’s summary 
dismissal of her application for post-conviction relief.72  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order, holding summary dis-
missal of the post-conviction relief application was proper because Delvo 
failed to present affidavits or other evidence in support of her application 
after she was put on notice the State was seeking summary disposition.73 
In 2005, Delvo pleaded guilty to certain drug-related charges.74  The 
district court placed her on probation.75  In 2008, the State sought to revoke 
Delvo’s probation, asserting fourteen separate grounds for its request.76  
The district court held a probation hearing at which Delvo admitted to four 
of the State’s allegations, including her conviction of ingesting a controlled 
substance, forgery, and possession of marijuana.77  Delvo’s probation offi-
cer also testified at the hearing.78  Based on Delvo’s admissions at the 
probation hearing, the district court revoked her probation.79 
In 2009, Delvo applied for post-conviction relief, asserting three 
grounds for her application.80  First, Delvo argued she did not voluntarily 
and knowingly make the admissions at the probation hearing.81  Second, 
Delvo asserted her admissions were unlawfully induced because the State 
had failed to disclose evidence favorable to her application.82  Finally, 
Delvo claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on her attorney’s 
failure to pursue perjury charges against her probation officer who allegedly 
gave false testimony at the hearing.83 
The State responded and requested a summary dismissal of Delvo’s 
application.84  The State did not make a separate motion, but rather argued 
 
71. 2010 ND 78, 782 N.W.2d 72. 
72. Delvo, ¶ 1, 782 N.W.2d at 73. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. ¶ 2. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. ¶ 3. 
77. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. 
78. Id. ¶ 4. 
79. Id. ¶ 5. 
80. Id. ¶ 6, 782 N.W.2d at 73-74. 
81. Id.  
82. Id., 782 N.W.2d at 74. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. ¶ 7. 
          
446 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:437 
in its response the district court should deny Delvo’s application.85  Delvo 
did not amend her application after the State filed its response.86  The 
district court, finding no genuine issue of material fact existed, chose not to 
hold a hearing on the matter and summarily dismissed Delvo’s 
application.87 
On appeal, Delvo argued the district court erred in summarily dismis-
sing her application and in not holding an evidentiary hearing.88  Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice VandeWalle first explained post-conviction 
relief proceedings are civil in nature and are governed accordingly by the 
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.89  Moreover, when reviewing a 
summary denial of an application for post-conviction relief, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court applies a standard of review similar to the standard 
for reviewing a summary judgment.90  Thus, “[t]he party opposing the 
motion for summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable inferences at 
the preliminary stages of a post-conviction proceeding and is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine issue of 
material fact.”91 
The court then explained section 29-32.1-09(1) of the North Dakota 
Century Code allows a district court, upon a motion by either party, to sum-
marily dismiss an application for post-conviction relief if no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.92  If the State moves for summary dismissal, 
the applicant must present evidence in support of her application.93  Thus, 
the court emphasized, an applicant for post-conviction relief is not required 
to present evidentiary support for her application until she is given notice 
the State is putting her to her proof.94  Once the applicant receives notice, 
however, she “must present competent admissible evidence by affidavit or 
other comparable means which raises an issue of material fact” and may not 
simply rely on conclusory allegations.95 
 
85. Id. 
86. Id.  
87. Id. ¶ 8. 
88. Id. ¶ 9. 
89. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Clark v. State, 2008 ND 234, ¶ 11, 758 N.W.2d 900, 905). Chief Justice 
VandeWalle delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Maring and Justice Sandstrom 
joined. 
90. Id. (citing Henke v. State, 2009 ND 117, ¶ 9, 767 N.W.2d 881, 884). 
91. Id. (quoting Berlin v. State, 2005 ND 110, ¶ 6, 698 N.W.2d 266, 269). 
92. Id. ¶ 12, 782 N.W.2d at 75 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-09(1) (2009)). 
93. Id. (citing Henke, ¶ 11, 767 N.W.2d at 885). 
94. Id. (quoting State v. Bender, 1998 ND 72, ¶ 20, 576 N.W.2d 210, 214). 
95. Id. (quoting Bender, ¶ 20). 
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In affirming the district court’s summary denial of Delvo’s application, 
the majority focused on whether the State put Delvo to her proof.96  The 
majority explained although the district court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing after the State requested summary dismissal, Delvo conceded she 
had notice she was put to her proof.97  Furthermore, Delvo did not contest 
the manner in which the State requested summary dismissal—response, 
rather than a motion.98  Accordingly, Delvo had notice and was required to 
present evidence in support of her application.99  Because Delvo failed to 
offer any evidence, which could raise a genuine issue of material fact, the 
district court did not err in summarily denying her application for post-
conviction relief.100 
Justice Crothers filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Kapsner.101  The dissent stated summary denial of the application for post-
conviction relief was not proper because “Delvo had no chance to make any 
argument in the district court because her action was dismissed without 
notice and without a motion by the State.”102  Justice Crothers explained the 
majority erred in concluding the State put Delvo to her proof by simply 
filing an answer to her application.103  The majority’s conclusion, the dis-
sent noted, contradicted the requirements set forth both in the post-convic-
tion relief statute and in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.104  
Neither law requires an application for post-conviction relief to contain spe-
cific evidence and neither obliges an applicant to respond to an answer.105 
The record on appeal showed, the dissent noted, the State failed to 
timely respond to Delvo’s application and discovery requests.106  In fact, the 
State did not file an answer until the district court scheduled a hearing on 
the matter.107  Even then, the State’s answer contained mere allegations the 
State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.108  Therefore, the dissent 
concluded Delvo had no notice she was put to her proof.109  Because Delvo 
did not have an opportunity to supply her proof and because the district 
 
96. Id. ¶ 13. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. ¶ 17, 782 N.W.2d at 76. 
101. Id. ¶¶ 19, 36. 
102. Id. ¶ 21, 782 N.W.2d at 77 (Crothers, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
103. Id. ¶ 22. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. ¶ 23. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. ¶ 24. 
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court summarily denied her application without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court’s order constituted legal error.110 
The dissent explained in post-conviction relief proceedings, the State 
may respond to an application either by filing an answer or by filing a mo-
tion to dismiss.111  The State in the present case chose to file an answer and 
referenced in its answer allegations the propriety of summary denial.112  
However, a district court may summarily deny an application for post-
conviction relief only after the State files a motion.113  An answer, the 
dissent stated, is not a motion.114 
Citing the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, the dissent 
explained a motion must be in writing and must state with specificity the 
grounds for the motion and the relief sought.115  On the other hand, an 
answer is simply one of the forms of pleadings, which addresses the merits 
of the case by usually denying the allegations set forth in the complaint.116  
Moreover, the dissent explained while the North Dakota Rules of Civil 
Procedure allow certain defenses to be raised by motion, rather than in an 
answer, no law allows “a defense to be alleged in an answer and then 
adjudicated as if a motion had been made.”117  The dissent further noted the 
primary purpose of a motion is to put both the court and the opposing party 
on notice regarding the nature of the claims and the relief sought.118  By 
using the State’s answer as a motion, the dissent concluded, the district 
court effectively deprived Delvo of her constitutional right to notice and 
opportunity to be heard.119  Because the State failed to file and serve a 
motion requesting summary dismissal, Delvo did not have notice she was 
being put to her proof.120  Therefore, the dissent stated, Delvo was not 
required to present evidentiary support after the State filed its answer, and 
the district court erred in summarily denying her application for post-
conviction relief.121 
 
110. Id., 782 N.W.2d at 77-78. 
111. Id. ¶ 26, 782 N.W.2d at 78. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-09(1) (2009)). 
114. Id. ¶ 28. 
115. Id. (quoting  N.D. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1)). 
116. Id. ¶ 29 (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 7(a)). 
117. Id. ¶ 31, 782 N.W.2d at 79 (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 12(b)). 
118. Id. ¶ 32 (citing Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven, 399 N.W.2d 855, 859 (N.D. 1987)). 
119. Id. ¶ 33. 
120. Id. ¶ 35, 782 N.W.2d at 79-80. 
121. Id. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIGHTING WORDS—ADJUDICATING A 
JUVENILE DELIQUENT FOR DISORDERLY CONDUCT 
IN RE H.K. 
In In re H.K.,122 H.K. appealed from an order finding her a delinquent 
child, contending the juvenile court erred by rejecting her motion to dis-
miss, allowing evidence beyond the scope of the allegations in the petition, 
and finding she committed disorderly conduct.123  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed.124 
The State filed a petition alleging H.K. committed the delinquent act of 
disorderly conduct on or about February 27, 2009.125  The petition stemmed 
from an incident at a teen center in Valley City, North Dakota, during 
which H.K. followed T.L., a teenage girl of African-American ancestry, 
into a bathroom, called T.L. a “nigger,” and threatened her.126  At a hearing 
on the matter, T.L. testified about the teen center events, an incident at a 
restaurant the same evening where more name-calling occurred, and an 
obscene gesture that H.K. made several weeks later.127  During the hearing, 
H.K. argued the State was attempting to make use of the word “nigger” a 
crime and was thereby violating her rights under the First Amendment, but 
the juvenile court still found H.K. to be a delinquent child.128 
On appeal, H.K. first argued the juvenile court should have dismissed 
the petition because the State failed to allege facts that satisfied the defini-
tion of disorderly conduct.129  To bring a juvenile within the jurisdiction of 
the court, a petition must provide facts alleging a delinquent act, such as a 
crime.130  Those factual allegations must also be specific enough to satisfy 
the adequate notice requirement of due process.131  The petition filed by the 
State generally restated the definition of disorderly conduct with the addi-
tion of alleging H.K. called T.L. a “nigger.”132  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court held the petition satisfactorily alleged specific facts to satisfy the 
definition of disorderly conduct and provided H.K. with adequate notice of 
 
122. 2010 ND 27, 778 N.W.2d 764. 
123. H.K., 2010 ND 27, ¶ 1, 778 N.W.2d at 764. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7, 778 N.W.2d at 766, 768. 
126. Id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 778 N.W.2d at 766-68. 
127. Id. ¶ 3, 778 N.W.2d at 766-67.  H.K. objected to the testimony relating to the gesture, 
arguing it was beyond the scope of the petition. Id. 
128. Id. ¶ 4, 778 N.W.2d at 767. 
129. Id. ¶ 6. 
130. Id. ¶ 8, 778 N.W.2d at 768. 
131. Id. ¶ 9. 
132. Id. ¶ 7. 
          
450 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:437 
the charges against her because the petition described H.K.’s conduct at the 
teen center.133 
H.K. argued further the juvenile court erred by denying her motion to 
dismiss because freedom of speech prohibited consideration of the state-
ments H.K. made when she called T.L. a “nigger,” and, therefore, there was 
no foundation for the disorderly conduct charge.134  Under North Dakota 
law, a person may not be charged with disorderly conduct based upon a 
constitutionally protected activity.135  While the First Amendment forbids 
the government from barring speech based upon the speech’s content, fight-
ing words that are likely to incite a breach of the peace are not protected by 
freedom of speech.136  The context in which an expression was used is 
examined to determine if the particular phrases are fighting words.137  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court held H.K.’s statements were fighting words 
because H.K. did more than simply yell racial slurs at T.L.138  The context 
in which the statements were made, as well as the threatening nature of her 
words, were likely to incite a breach of the peace or provoke a violent 
reaction.139  Consequently, the statements were properly considered by the 
juvenile court as evidence of disorderly conduct.140 
H.K. next argued the juvenile court erred when it considered evidence 
beyond the scope of the petition.141  During the hearing, the juvenile court 
allowed testimony from T.L. about events that took place at a restaurant 
after she left the teen center and about events that occurred weeks later.142  
H.K. objected to the admission of testimony concerning the latter but failed 
to object to the testimony about events at the restaurant.143  An issue not 
raised during the hearing may not be considered on appeal unless the issue 
is an obvious error affecting a substantial right.144  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held the admission of the testimony did not affect H.K.’s 
substantial rights because it was not essential to the juvenile court’s finding 
that H.K. committed the crime.145  Although testimony regarding events 
 
133. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 778 N.W.2d at 768-69. 
134. Id. ¶ 11, 778 N.W.2d at 769. 
135. Id. ¶ 12. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-01(2) (2009) (stating “[t]his section does 
not apply to constitutionally protected activity”). 
136. H.K., ¶ 13, 778 N.W.2d at 770. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. ¶ 14. 
139. Id.  
140. Id. 
141. Id. ¶ 15. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 778 N.W.2d at 771. 
144. Id. ¶ 16. 
145. Id. 
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weeks after the teen center testimony was admitted in error over H.K.’s 
objection, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the admission did not in-
duce the juvenile court to base its finding on incompetent evidence because 
the finding could have been based entirely on the events at the teen 
center.146 
Finally, H.K. argued the juvenile court’s finding that H.K. performed 
actions that satisfied the definition of disorderly conduct was clearly erro-
neous.147  After reiterating H.K.’s conduct at the teen center, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court held the juvenile court’s finding that H.K. com-
mitted disorderly conduct was not clearly erroneous.148  Having rejected all 
of H.K.’s contentions of error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed 
the juvenile court’s order.149 
 
146. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. 
147. Id. ¶ 19. 
148. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 778 N.W.2d at 772. 
149. Id. ¶ 22. 
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CRIMINAL LAW—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—EVIDENCE 
STATE V. STRIDIRON 
In State v. Stridiron,150 Antonio Phillip Stridiron appealed from crimi-
nal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of felony murder.151  
Bradley A. Davis appealed from a criminal judgment entered on a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault.152  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the criminal judg-
ments, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its pre-trial 
rulings and concluding sufficient evidence existed to support the convic-
tions.153 
On July 29, 2007, Joshua Velasquez was found dead in Minot, North 
Dakota.154  His body was discovered in an alley, across the street from a 
duplex where he had attended a party the night before.155  Stridiron and 
Davis were living in the duplex at the time of the murder.156  After police 
conducted an investigation, the State charged Stridiron with felony murder 
and Davis with aggravated assault.157  The State asserted Stridiron shot 
Velasquez with a handgun after Davis struck Velasquez with “a garden tool 
containing serrated blades.”158  The district court consolidated the cases for 
trial.159  The jury returned guilty verdicts.160 
On appeal, Davis argued the district court erred in granting the State’s 
pre-trial motion to join the cases for trial over Davis’s objection and in 
failing to sever the cases when Davis renewed his objection during voir 
dire.161  The North Dakota Supreme Court disagreed, concluding the district 
court did not err in joining the cases for trial and refusing to grant Davis’s 
request for severance during voir dire.162  The court explained under Rule 
13 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the 
authority to “order two or more indictments, informations, or complaints to 
be tried together if the offenses and the defendants, if there is more than 
 
150. 2010 ND 19, 777 N.W.2d 892. 
151. Stridiron, ¶ 1, 777 N.W.2d at 895. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. ¶ 2. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 896. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. ¶ 3. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. ¶ 4. 
162. Id. ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d at 897. 
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one, could have been joined in a single indictment, information, or com-
plaint.”163  The court further explained joinder is proper when multiple 
defendants participated jointly in an act.164  But even when joinder is proper 
before trial, the court noted, severance of the cases may still be necessary at 
a later point if the district court determines substantial prejudice exists to 
one of the defendants as a result of the previously granted joinder.165  
Accordingly, under Rule 14 of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a district court has a continuing duty to monitor whether the 
joinder causes substantial prejudice and to order severance in cases where 
justice so requires.166 
The State charged Stridiron and Davis with participating in the murder 
of Joshua Velasquez.167  On appeal, Davis conceded the joinder allowed for 
judicial economy, but argued he was prejudiced because:  a newspaper 
article stated Davis and Stridiron’s trial was for the murder of Joshua 
Velasquez; evidence introduced at trial was relevant to Stridiron’s murder 
charge, but not Davis’s assault charge; and Stridiron’s attorney attempted to 
implicate Davis in the murder of Velasquez.168  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court, however, rejected Davis’s arguments, holding Davis failed to dem-
onstrate any prejudice to the jury resulting from the newspaper article.169  In 
addition, the court stated “[b]are allegations that a defendant would stand a 
better chance of acquittal in a separate trial . . . [are] insufficient to compel 
severance.”170  Finally, the court reiterated its prior holding that “an attempt 
by one defendant to exculpate himself by inculpating another defendant is 
insufficient ground to require separate trials.”171  Therefore, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting 
the State’s pre-trial motion for joinder and in declining to grant Davis’s 
request for severance during voir dire.172 
Stridiron also argued on appeal the district court erred in denying his 
pre-trial motions to pool the jury for bias through a public opinion survey 
and to change the trial venue on the ground of prejudicial pre-trial publi-
city.173  The supreme court explained Rule 21(a) of the North Dakota Rules 
 
163. Id. ¶ 6, 777 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting N.D. R. CRIM. P. 13). 
164. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 8 explanatory note). 
165. Id. (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 14). 
166. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 897 (citing N.D. R. CRIM. P. 14). 
167. Id. ¶ 7. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. ¶ 8. 
170. Id. (quoting State v. Wamre, 1999 ND 164, ¶ 30, 599 N.W.2d 268, 279). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. ¶ 9. 
173. Id. ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d at 897-98. 
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of Criminal Procedure requires a district court, upon a defendant’s motion, 
to “transfer the proceeding against the defendant to another county if the 
court is satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendants exists in the 
transferring county that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial 
there.”174  However, the court noted publicity alone is not sufficient to 
establish prejudice and stated a criminal defendant bears the burden of 
showing the publicity did in fact prejudice him.175  The court added “[t]he 
quantity of media coverage does not control a motion for change of ven-
ue.”176  What controls, the court explained, is the prejudicial effect of such 
coverage upon the defendant’s ability to obtain a fair and impartial trial.177 
The supreme court rejected Stridiron’s arguments that the district court 
erred in denying his pre-trial motions.178  The court explained the district 
court conducted its own extensive questioning of the jury to assess the 
jury’s knowledge of the case and determine any possible bias.179  Moreover, 
each juror was questioned both by the court and by the parties.180  Because 
the district court was in a better position to listen to the jury’s responses and 
draw any inferences from them, and because the district court was better 
able to ascertain the prejudicial effect of any pre-trial media publicity, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stridiron’s pre-trial 
motions to pool the jury and to change the trial venue.181 
Furthermore, both Stridiron and Davis argued the State’s use of a 
peremptory challenge to excuse the only African-American individual from 
the jury was racially motivated and asserted the district court was clearly 
erroneous in ruling it was not.182  In addressing the appellants’ argument, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court first noted the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits the prosecution from using a peremptory challenge when the only 
basis for the challenge is race.183  The court then explained when a defen-
dant challenges the use of a peremptory challenge, the defendant must 
show:  (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the peremp-
tory challenge was used to excuse another member of defendant’s group; 
(2) he is entitled to rely on the fact peremptory challenges “constitute a jury 
 
174. Id. ¶ 11, 777 N.W.2d at 898 (quoting N.D. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. ¶ 14, 777 N.W.2d at 899. 
179. Id. ¶ 12, 777 N.W.2d at 898. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 777 N.W.2d at 898-99 (quoting State v. Austin, 520 N.W.2d 564, 568 
(N.D.1994)). 
182. Id. ¶ 15, 777 N.W.2d at 899.  Both Davis and Stridiron are African-American. Id. ¶ 2, 
777 N.W.2d at 895. 
183. Id. ¶ 16, 777 N.W.2d at 899 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986)). 
          
2010] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 455 
selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to 
discriminate[;]’” and (3) the relevant circumstances raise an inference of 
purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecution.184  If the defendant 
meets all three requirements, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to 
give a clear and reasonably specific race-neutral explanation for the use of 
the peremptory challenge in question.185  The court concluded the State 
successfully met its burden in the case at hand.186  The State’s explanation 
that the juror was excused because she had served as a juror in an earlier 
homicide case, which the prosecutor had tried, was reading a book while 
the judge was talking to the jury members and had unsatisfactory responses 
to the questions related to self-defense.  This overcame the prima facie evi-
dence of racial motivation in the use of the peremptory challenge.187  
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the 
exclusion of the only African-American from the jury pool “was not based 
on race.”188 
Next, Stridiron argued the district court erred in denying his request to 
introduce testimony from a witness stating Davis had confessed to the mur-
der.189  Stridiron contended the testimony was admissible under the state-
ment against interest exception of Rule 804(b)(3) of the North Dakota Rules 
of Evidence.190  The North Dakota Supreme Court explained Rule 804(3)(b) 
has three requirements.191  First, the party seeking to invoke the exception 
must show the declarant is unavailable.192  Second, the statement must be of 
such nature as to expose the declarant to criminal liability at the time he 
made the statement.193  Finally, the statement must be corroborated by cir-
cumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.194  In denying Stridiron’s 
motion, the district court found the proposed testimony failed the trust-
worthiness requirement of Rule 804(3)(b).195  On appeal, Stridiron asserted 
the district court should have focused on the trustworthiness of Davis’s 
“confession,” not the trustworthiness of the witness’s proposed 
testimony.196 
 
184. Id. (citations omitted). 
185. Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98). 
186. Id. ¶ 17, 777 N.W.2d at 900. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. ¶ 18. 
189. Id. ¶ 19. 
190. Id. ¶ 20. 
191. Id. ¶ 21. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 901. 
195. Id. ¶ 22.  
196. Id. 
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Recognizing the issue raised by Stridiron was one of first impression 
for the court, the North Dakota Supreme Court first discussed the split in 
jurisdictions that have previously addressed Stridiron’s argument.197  The 
court ultimately agreed “with the courts which allow a district court to 
analyze the veracity of the in-court witness because those decisions are 
better reasoned and give effect to the intention of the drafters of Fed. R. Ev. 
804(b)(3).”198  Accordingly, the court adopted the rule that a district court 
determining the “corroborating circumstances” under Rule 804(b)(3) must 
analyze “both the credibility of the in-court witness and the reliability of the 
out-of-court declarant.”199  To assist district courts in applying the newly 
adopted rule, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided several non-
exclusive factors district courts may consider in determining “the veracity 
of the in-court witness and the reliability of the out-of-court declarant.”200  
The factors include an inquiry into the declarant’s motive to misrepresent 
the matter, the general character of the in-court witness, the spontaneity of 
the statement, and the relationship between the declarant and the witness.201 
Here, the district court found the proposed in-court witness had a 
motive to misrepresent the matter because she was the best friend of 
Stridiron’s girlfriend.202  Furthermore, the district court analyzed the verac-
ity of Davis’s alleged confession and determined the evidence was insuf-
ficient to make the “confession” trustworthy.203  Because the Supreme 
Court concluded the district court properly applied the factors for analyzing 
corroborating circumstances under Rule 804(3)(b), the court affirmed the 
district court’s ruling that the proffered testimony was inadmissible.204 
Finally, Davis argued insufficient evidence existed to support his con-
viction for aggravated assault.205  Davis’s argument was largely based on 
the jury’s unwillingness to accept his self-defense assertion at trial.206  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court explained when a defendant brings a suffi-
ciency of the evidence challenge on appeal, the court “does not sit as a 
thirteenth juror to make independent determinations of credibility of 
 
197. Id. ¶ 23. 
198. Id. ¶ 24, 777 N.W.2d at 902. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. ¶ 25. 
201. Id., 777 N.W.2d at 902-03 (quoting United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55, 56 (8th 
Cir. 1986)). 
202. Id. ¶ 26, 777 N.W.2d at 903. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. ¶ 27. 
205. Id. ¶ 28. 
206. Id. ¶ 31. 
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witnesses or other evidentiary weight.”207  The court stated a number of 
witnesses testified to seeing Davis strike Velasquez with the garden tool.208  
Thus, the court determined sufficient evidence existed to support the 
conviction and affirm the jury verdict of guilty.209 
 
207. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
          
458 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:437 
CRIMINAL LAW—SEXUAL OFFENSES—EVIDENCE 
STATE V. PAUL 
In State v. Paul,210 Wilson Grant Paul, Sr. appealed from a jury verdict 
finding him guilty of gross sexual imposition.211  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court, concluding the district court did not commit a reversible 
error during the evidentiary hearing, affirmed the judgment because the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict.212 
In August 2007, L.L., Paul’s girlfriend’s nine-year-old niece, who was 
then living in Oklahoma with her older sister, V.L., and the mother of 
Paul’s girlfriend, S.L., told V.L. and S.L. that Paul had touched her inap-
propriately while she was visiting Paul and his girlfriend a month earlier.213  
S.L. reported her conversation with L.L. to the Oklahoma Department of 
Health and Human Services.214  A social worker subsequently conducted an 
interview with L.L., which the social worker videotaped.215  As a result of 
the interview and following further investigation by the authorities, Paul 
was charged with gross sexual imposition.216  Specifically, the basis for the 
charge was L.L.’s statement that Paul made her “touch his penis with her 
hand.”217 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the admis-
sibility of L.L.’s out-of-court statements to V.L., S.L., and the social 
worker.218  The district court found the statements were admissible.219  At 
trial, the district court allowed the jury to both view L.L.’s videotaped inter-
view and to hear V.L.’s and S.L.’s testimony about L.L.’s allegations of 
sexual abuse.220  The court further allowed the State to present expert 
testimony regarding the time it takes children to report sexual abuse and 
their presentation when making such reports.221  L.L. testified on three 
separate occasions during trial.222  In her first two testimonies, she denied 
remembering any sexual abuse.223  On the third time, however, she stated 
 
210. 2009 ND 120, 769 N.W.2d 416. 
211. Paul, ¶ 1, 769 N.W.2d at 418. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
214. Id. ¶ 3. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. ¶ 4, 769 N.W.2d at 419. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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Paul had made improper sexual advances toward her while she was in his 
apartment.224  Paul denied L.L.’s allegations and called his girlfriend to tes-
tify in his defense.225  At the end of trial, the jury returned a guilty ver-
dict.226  Paul was subsequently sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, 
seven of which were suspended.227 
On appeal, Paul argued the district court erred in allowing the State to 
introduce expert testimony on the delayed reporting of sexual abuse by chil-
dren and on children’s presentation regarding such reports.228  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court analyzed Paul’s argument by stating under Rule 702 
of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, “[A] witness who qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” as long as his or her testi-
mony would assist the jury in understanding the evidence.229  The court 
noted the decision to admit expert testimony is within the discretion of the 
district court and will not be overturned on appeal unless the district court 
acted “in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.”230  
Because the State’s expert witness was a counselor from the Rape and 
Abuse Crisis Center who had a master’s degree in clinical education and 
had worked with more than one hundred sexually abused children, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in ruling the witness could testify as an expert on the narrow 
issue of delay in reporting sexual abuse by children.231 
Next, Paul challenged the district court’s admission of L.L.’s out-of-
court statements, including L.L.’s statements to V.L., S.L., and the social 
worker.232  Paul first challenged the admission of the statement on grounds 
of insufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and reliability, as required by 
Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.233  However, because 
Paul only objected to the admission of the evidence pre-trial and failed to 
do so at trial, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated it would review the 
admission of L.L.’s out-of-court statements only for “obvious error 
 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. ¶ 5. 
229. Id. ¶ 6 (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 702). 
230. Id. (citing State v. Schmidkunz, 2006 ND 192, ¶ 15, 721 N.W.2d 387, 393). 
231. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 769 N.W.2d at 419-20. 
232. Id. ¶ 9, 769 N.W.2d at 420. 
233. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.  Rule 803(24) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence supplies a hearsay 
exception for a child’s out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse. Id. ¶ 12. 
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affecting substantial rights.”234  The court then explained Rule 803(24) 
requires a district court to consider and make explicit findings on the 
following non-exclusive factors of trustworthiness:  “(1) ‘spontaneity and 
consistent repetition’ of the statements, (2) ‘the mental state of the declar-
ant,’ (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age,’ and (4) ‘a 
lack of motive to fabricate.’”235  A district court’s ruling to admit certain 
evidence is discretionary, the court noted, and will not be disturbed unless 
“the ruling was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”236  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
L.L.’s out-of-court statements were admissible because the district court 
carefully considered and thoroughly analyzed each of these factors.237  In 
particular, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did 
not commit an obvious error because the district court found all four factors 
for trustworthiness were met:  (1) L.L. repeated her allegation of sexual 
abuse numerous times to her sister, V.L., and spontaneously told S.L. and 
the social worker about the abuse when asked what happened; (2) L.L. was 
emotional when talking about the alleged abuse, as evidenced by her 
crying; (3) the terminology L.L. used was appropriate for a child of similar 
age; and (4) no evidence showed L.L. had a motive to fabricate the sexual 
abuse allegations.238 
Paul further argued L.L.’s out-of-court statements implicated him in 
“other crimes” and the admission of these “other crimes” constituted a re-
versible error under Rule 404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence.239  
The “other crimes” Paul referred to involved prior sexual contact between 
Paul and L.L.240  Both V.L. and S.L. testified L.L. had informed them Paul 
had sexually abused her on several occasions prior to the July 2007 inci-
dent.241  Paul argued the district court abused its discretion by allowing 
V.L. and S.L. to testify to those “other [uncharged] crimes.”242 
In addressing Paul’s 404(b) argument, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court explained, “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admis-
sible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conform-
ity therewith.”243  The court clarified, however, evidence of other crimes is 
 
234. Id. ¶ 11 (citing State v. Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 13, 744 N.W.2d 284, 291). 
235. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Muhle, 2007 ND 131, ¶ 12, 737 N.W.2d 636, 640). 
236. Id., 769 N.W.2d at 421 (citing Wegley, 2008 ND 4, ¶ 12, 744 N.W.2d at 290-91). 
237. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 769 N.W.2d at 421-22. 
238. Id. ¶ 13. 
239. Id. ¶¶ 9, 15, 769 N.W.2d at 420, 422. 
240. See id. ¶ 15, 769 N.W.2d at 422. 
241. Id. ¶ 16. 
242. See id. ¶¶ 15-16. 
243. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting N.D. R. EVID. 404(b)). 
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admissible to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”244  The court stated dis-
trict courts must consider three factors in determining the admissibility of 
other crimes evidence.245  First, district courts must consider the purpose for 
which the evidence of other crimes is being offered.246  Next, district courts 
must determine whether the evidence of prior acts is substantially relia-
ble.247  Moreover, if evidence of other crimes is offered in a criminal case, 
proof of the crime charged must exist as to allow the jury to “establish the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence independently on the evidence presented, 
without consideration of the evidence of prior acts.”248  Finally, under Rule 
403 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, district courts must consider 
whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect.249 
After reviewing the district court’s findings, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evi-
dence of Paul’s prior acts of sexual abuse against L.L.250  The court rea-
soned the lapse of time—fourteen months—between Paul’s prior acts of 
sexual abuse and the July 2007 incident did not render Paul’s prior acts 
“wholly independent crimes.”251  The court explained because Paul did not 
have access to L.L. during the lapse and because “the prior acts and charged 
crime involved the same victim,” Paul’s prior acts of sexual abuse were not 
evidence of “wholly independent crimes,” but rather constituted “evidence 
of activity in furtherance of the same criminal activity.”252  The district 
court’s ruling to admit evidence of Paul’s prior sexual abuse against L.L. 
was not, therefore, a reversible error.253 
Finally, Paul argued the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty 
verdict.254  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated appellate review of suf-
ficiency of the evidence is rather limited because the court considers only 
the evidence “most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences 
 
244. Id. (quoting N.D.R. EVID. 404(b)). 
245. Id. ¶ 18. 
246. Id. (citing State v. Alvarado, 2008 ND 203, ¶ 14, 757 N.W.2d 570, 577). 
247. Id. (citing Alvarado, ¶ 14). 
248. Id. (citing Alvarado, ¶ 14). 
249. Id. (citing Alvarado, ¶ 19). 
250. Id. ¶ 28, 769 N.W.2d at 426. 
251. Id. ¶¶ 23-25, 769 N.W.2d at 424-25 (citing State v. Thomson, 533 S.E.2d 834, 839 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2000)) (“When there is a period of time during which there is no evidence of 
sexual abuse, the lapse does not require exclusion of the evidence if the defendant did not have 
access to the victim . . . during the lapse.”). 
252. Id. ¶¶ 24-25 (citing Alvarado, ¶ 12, 757 N.W.2d at 576). 
253. Id. ¶ 28, 769 N.W.2d at 426. 
254. Id. ¶ 29. 
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therefrom to see if there is substantial evidence to warrant a conviction.”255  
The court will reverse a conviction only if “no rational fact finder could 
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”256  Viewing 
the evidence in light most favorable to the prosecution, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court held L.L.’s testimony that Paul made her “touch his penis 
with her hand” was sufficient to establish sexual contact and sustain the 
conviction of gross sexual imposition.257 
 
255. Id. ¶ 30. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. ¶ 31 (citing State v. Morstad, 493 N.W.2d 645, 646 (N.D. 1992) (explaining the 
uncorroborated testimony of a child is sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for a sexual offense)). 
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FAMILY LAW—CHILD CUSTODY—BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD FACTORS 
FRUEH V. FRUEH 
In Frueh v. Frueh,258 Darin Frueh appealed a district court order 
denying his motion for a change of custody.259  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court held the district court relied on impermissible factors in considering 
whether a change of custody was in the best interest of the child.260  The 
court explained Darin Frueh’s child support payment amount, which was 
set by the district court, should not have been considered a relevant 
factor.261  The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the 
case.262 
Darin Frueh (Frueh) and Malissa Frueh Hoheisel (Hoheisel) were 
married in 1992 and had one child in 1994.263  The couple divorced in Janu-
ary 2004.264  During the divorce, the parties stipulated Hoheisel would take 
physical custody of the child and Frueh would have visitation rights.265  The 
stipulation was incorporated into the final divorce judgment.266  When 
Frueh’s child support obligation was initially set, he was a self-employed 
farmer of 3300 acres.267  Frueh’s average income over the five-year period 
prior to the divorce was below the minimum wage.  Accordingly, in July 
2004, the district court set Frueh’s child support payment at the “minimum 
wage” amount of $168 per month.268  The amount of child support had not 
been reviewed since July 2004.269 
In July 2007, Frueh made the motion to modify the custody arrange-
ment.270  Frueh argued several events amounted to a material change in 
circumstances, including Hoheisel’s move from Goodrich to Bismarck, 
Hoheisel’s remarriage, the child’s desire to live with Frueh, and allegations 
that Hoheisel’s husband physically assaulted the child.271  In support of 
Frueh’s motion, the child signed an affidavit that explained why the child 
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wanted to live with Frueh and alleged that Hoheisel’s husband grabbed the 
child by the throat in 2006.272  The district court concluded Frueh’s allega-
tions did not amount to a material change and denied Frueh an evidentiary 
hearing.273  On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held Frueh estab-
lished a prima facie case by showing there was a material change in circum-
stances.274  The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded 
for an evidentiary hearing on Frueh’s motion.275 
On remand and after an evidentiary hearing, the district court again 
denied Frueh’s motion to modify custody.276  At the hearing in August 
2008, several witnesses testified.277  Although the district court found there 
was a material change in circumstances, the court concluded a change in 
custody was not in the best interest of the child.278  The district court con-
sidered the child’s interest in living with Frueh, but discounted the child’s 
preference because it determined he was not mature.279  Also, the district 
court discussed Frueh’s child support payment.280  The district court noted 
Frueh currently had a large farming operation and gave expensive gifts to 
the child, yet his child support obligation was still based upon the “mini-
mum wage” amount.281  The district court commented Frueh attempted to 
buy the affections of the child and because Hoheisel did not have the finan-
cial resources to compete, the factor favored Hoheisel.282 
On appeal, Frueh argued the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for a change of custody.283  Frueh contended:  (1) the district court 
improperly based its decision on its opinion that Frueh was not paying 
sufficient child support, and (2) its finding that the child was not a mature 
child for purposes of expressing a preference was clearly erroneous.284  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Frueh and held the district court 
misapplied the law when it considered the amount of Frueh’s child support 
obligation.285  The court explained a district court may modify a prior 
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custody order after two years from the time since an order establishing 
custody was entered if the court finds: 
On the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior order or which 
were unknown to the court at the time of the prior order, a material 
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the par-
ties; and the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of 
the child.286 
The court noted the district court must consider whether a change in 
custody is necessary to serve the best interests of the child if it finds there 
has been a material change in circumstances.287  As the proponent of the 
custody modification, Frueh had the burden of proving both that there had 
been a material change in circumstances and that a change in custody was 
necessary to serve the child’s best interests.288  In determining whether the 
child’s best interest would be served by a modification, the court must 
apply the factors set out by statute.289  The court explained a district court’s 
decision to modify custody is a finding of fact and will not be reversed un-
less it was clearly erroneous.290 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court clearly erred 
when it impermissibly considered Frueh’s child support obligation.291  The 
court explained child support payments are presumed to be correct when set 
using the child support guidelines.  In this case, Frueh’s support obligation 
was based upon the guidelines in July 2004 and, therefore, should have 
been presumed to be the correct amount of support.292  Further, there was 
no evidence that Frueh ever was late or missed a child support payment.293  
The court held the district court misapplied the law when it improperly con-
sidered Frueh’s child support payment insufficient, despite the presumed 
correctness of the payment.294 
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined Frueh failed to meet his 
burden of proving the district court clearly erred when it discounted the 
child’s preference to live with Frueh.295  The court explained a child’s 
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preference is given more weight as children mature.296  The district court 
found the child was not mature and his preference was not a factor in decid-
ing custody.297  The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court’s 
determination was supported by the evidence and was not clearly errone-
ous.298  Thus, there was no clear error on this factor, but the court reversed 
the district court’s order denying Frueh’s motion for a change in custody—
because the district court clearly erred when it considered the amount of 
Frueh’s child support—and remanded the case to properly consider the best 
interest factors.299 
Justice Maring filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.300  Justice 
Maring concurred with the majority in its finding of no reversible error, but 
dissented from the majority reversing the case.301  Justice Maring explained 
the trial court did not deny the motion to modify custody because it 
concluded Frueh paid too little child support, but rather that Frueh’s 
credibility was called into question because Frueh gave his child extrava-
gant gifts and money while he made child support payments based on the 
“minimum wage” amount.302  Justice Maring stated the district court’s 
order denying Frueh’s motion to modify custody was supported by the 
evidence, and the district court did not misapply the law or consider 
improper evidence.303 
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HOUSING DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR V. MATRIX PROPERTIES 
In Department of Labor v. Matrix Properties,304 the State, through the 
Department of Labor (Department), appealed from a summary judgment 
dismissing its discriminatory housing practice action on the ground the 
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.305  The State 
contended the district court erred when it ruled the civil action was barred 
by the two-year statute of limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and 
section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.306  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.307 
Evert Johnson, who is disabled and uses a wheelchair, issued a com-
plaint to the Department in December 2005.308  Johnson alleged Matrix 
Properties Corporation, formerly known as E.W. Wylie Corporation, Wild 
& Associates, Ltd., and Ulteig Engineers, Inc. (collectively, Matrix), 
committed discriminatory acts by failing to comply with the design and 
construction requirements under federal and state law for the Stonebridge 
Apartments in Fargo.309  The apartment building Johnson lived in received 
its certificate of occupancy from the city in 1998.310  After an investigation, 
the Department issued a determination of reasonable cause and a charge of 
discrimination against Matrix in January 2007, and Matrix elected to have 
the claims decided in district court.311 
Matrix moved for summary judgment dismissal of the action, claiming 
it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under the federal Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) and the state Housing Discrimination Act.312  The dis-
trict court determined the statute of limitations required any action concern-
ing the design and construction of the apartment building must be brought 
within two years from the issuance of the certificate of occupancy in 
1998.313  Because the civil action was not brought until 2005, the court dis-
missed the action as time barred.314  An alternative claim that Matrix had 
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engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination was also dismissed with-
out prejudice because the State had failed to first make an administrative 
determination of reasonable cause.315 
The court began its analysis by outlining the standard of review, stating 
the determination of when a cause of action accrues is generally a question 
of fact, but if there is no dispute about the relevant facts, the determination 
is a question of law for the court.316  The court next examined the legisla-
ture’s goals in adopting North Dakota’s Housing Discrimination Act, 
chapter 14-02.5 of the North Dakota Century Code, in 1999.317  The first 
goal was to establish “a regulatory authority and administrative process for 
receiving and investigating charges of housing discrimination under state 
law.”318  Next, the Housing Discrimination Act “provides for state enforce-
ment of federal fair housing law, provided that its provisions are ‘substan-
tially equivalent’ to . . . those in the Federal Fair Housing Act.”319  The 
“substantial equivalency” component was important to ensure the state 
agency could be “eligible to receive federal funds from HUD [Department 
of Housing and Urban Development] to investigate charges of housing 
discrimination filed under federal law.”320  The State contended North 
Dakota’s Housing Discrimination Act had been certified by the Secretary of 
HUD as being substantially equivalent to the rights, procedures, and reme-
dies created under the federal FHA.321  “Discrimination” is defined to in-
clude a failure to “design and construct” covered multifamily dwellings that 
comport with certain accessibility requirements for handicapped persons.322 
A civil action to enforce the design and construction requirements may 
be brought by an aggrieved person and “not later than the second year after 
the date of the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory 
housing practice.”323  The State argued the two-year limitation period began 
to run only when Johnson discovered the design and construction flaws in 
the Stonebridge Apartments, and the lawsuit was, therefore, brought in a 
timely manner, while the defendants argued the two-year limitation period 
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began to run in 1998, when Fargo issued the certificate of occupancy.324  
The district court agreed with the defendant’s interpretation and concluded 
because the lawsuit was not brought until 2005, it was time barred.325 
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3613(a)(1)(A) and section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century 
Code presented a question of law.326  The first rule of statutory construction 
is to determine the intent of the legislature by first looking at the language 
of the statute.327  The operative language in 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) and 
section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code is identical, with 
both stating a civil action must be commenced not later than two years after 
the “occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing 
practice.”328  The issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run in a 
design and construction case brought under the FHA was a question of first 
impression in North Dakota.329 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found the Virginia decision Moseke 
v. Miller and Smith, Inc.330 instructive, which examined when the statute of 
limitations would be triggered.331  The Moseke court focused on the “occur-
rence rule,” which it observed “ties the running of the limitations period to 
the occurrence of the act or omission causing the injury,” rather than when 
the plaintiff discovered the injury.332  The State argued the statute of 
limitation period did not begin to run until units in the challenged housing 
development became available to persons with disabilities, and so long as 
the units did not conform to those requirements, there was an ongoing 
discriminatory practice.333  The State supported its continuing violation 
argument by citing to Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,334 and analogizing 
design and construction cases to race discrimination cases under the 
FHA.335 
Several courts have refused to apply the continuous violation doctrine 
to design and construction cases under the FHA, including Garcia v. 
Brockway,336 in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the statute 
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of limitations in a design and construction case under the FHA is “triggered 
at the conclusion of the design-and-construction phase, which occurs on the 
date the last certificate of occupancy is issued.”337  Despite a split of author-
ity on the issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the holding in 
Garcia because its reasoning was persuasive and it was the only federal 
circuit court of appeals decision to directly address the specific issue.338 
The State argued the court should not follow Garcia because the words 
used by the North Dakota Legislature in enacting chapter 14-02.5 of the 
North Dakota Century Code showed the legislature did not intend for the 
statute of limitations triggering date to be at the completion of the construc-
tion of a dwelling.339  However, the court stated the legislative history did 
not shed light on when the statute of limitations was triggered and was 
instead concerned the state law be “substantially equivalent” to federal 
law.340  In the context of a design and construction case, it is the completion 
of the construction, rather than the mere existence of a noncompliant build-
ing, which constitutes the act that triggers the limitation period.341 
Because the State did not raise on appeal the concern that the district 
court’s decision converts the statute of limitations into a statute of repose, 
amici curiae were prohibited from raising the issue and were “limited to 
issues raised on appeal by the parties.”342  Hanson v. Williams County343 
held a products liability statute of repose violated the equal protection pro-
vision of the North Dakota Constitution.344  However, the court noted even 
if section 14-02.5-39(1) of the North Dakota Century Code was a statute of 
repose, statutes of repose are not invariably unconstitutional.345 
The State further contended the FHA and the Housing Discrimination 
Act should be liberally construed.346  However, the court will “not ignore 
the clear language of a statute under the guise of liberal construction.”347  
The policy-making bodies of government make the decision of whether 
public policy would be better served by extending the limitation period.348  
Thus, the court concluded the two-year statute of limitations was triggered 
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when the building in which Johnson resided received its certificate of 
occupancy in 1998, and the civil action time was barred because it was not 
commenced until 2005.349  The district court’s summary judgment dismissal 
was affirmed.350 
Justice Kapsner dissented, joined by Justice Maring.351  The dissent 
claimed if an owner of a building can survive two years after the construc-
tion without litigation, the owner can continue to reap the benefits of 
noncompliant construction, and persons with disabilities are denied the 
protections that were intended by federal and state statutes.352  Justice 
Kapsner stated the majority followed an interpretation of the statutes that 
denies the relief the housing statutes were designed to provide.353  The 
dissent noted the certificate of occupancy does not have a relationship to the 
requirements of the statutes, but instead shows only that the premises may 
be occupied under the municipal codes.354  The majority and the Garcia 
court viewed the certificate of occupancy as a starting point for the statute 
of limitations.355  In applying this notion, the Garcia court relied on 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,356 which has since been super-
seded by statute as contrary to congressional intent in its analysis of the 
statute of limitations.357 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009358 addressed pay discrimi-
nation and indicated pay discrimination was a continuing violation, allow-
ing for a new claim to be filed each time a paycheck was issued.359  The Act 
included the specific congressional finding that the “Ledbetter decision 
undermine[d] those statutory protections by unduly restricting the time 
period in which victims of discrimination [could] challenge and recover for 
discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the 
intent of Congress.”360  Justice Kapsner found persuasive the rationale be-
hind the Act that the United States Supreme Court erred in its analysis of 
the statute of limitations.361  Because North Dakota’s housing statutes were 
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designed to mirror the federal statues, Justice Kapsner believed the clear 
indication from Congress that the United States Supreme Court misinter-
preted congressional intent on the limitations period to be applied in 
Ledbetter should now inform decisions about the period of limitations, 
instead of the flawed reasoning of Garcia, which incorporated the incorrect 
reasoning of Ledbetter.362 
Further, the Ledbetter decision did not correspond with the United 
States Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the Fair Housing Act in 
Havens.363  Justice Kapsner believed the State’s position, that there can be a 
continuing violation of the statute and that the period of limitations does not 
run while the violation continues, was the appropriate position and sup-
ported by the language in both the state and federal statutes.364  Other courts 
have held the ongoing offering for sale or lease of properties which are 
noncompliant with the adaptive design requirements constituted a continu-
ing violation under similar language in the federal statute.365  Justice 
Kapsner also noted the owner/lessor is treated differently than the architects 
and contractors who constructed the noncompliant building.366  Thus, the 
result in Moseke could only apply to one defendant in this case.367 
According to Justice Kapsner, the majority’s analysis was incorrect 
when it separated a single subsection from the interpretation of the statute 
as a whole.368  Subsection 3 is a definitional subsection of section 14-02.5-
06 of the North Dakota Century Code that provides context to subsections 1 
and 2.369  A violation of the general prohibition against discrimination is 
contained in the overarching provisions of the statute, which is contained in 
subsections 1 and 2.370  The dissent in Garcia echoed Kapsner’s position, 
believing the statute of limitations begins when the individual first attempts 
to buy, rent, or test the FHA-noncompliant unit.371  The Garcia dissent ex-
plained it was at that time that the person with the disability was discrimi-
nated against by the developer or landlord.372  A person that does not at-
tempt to rent until more than two years after completion of the building has 
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no remedy under the majority’s interpretation.373  Justice Kapsner inter-
preted the statutes as declaring an owner, who continues to offer for rent or 
sale a nonconforming unit, has not yet terminated a discriminatory housing 
practice, and it is the termination of the discriminatory housing practice that 
would start the period of limitations.374  Thus, because Johnson rented the 
apartment in March 2005 and moved out of the apartment in October 2005, 
Johnson’s claim would be timely.375 
Finally, despite the majority not addressing the issue of a statute of 
repose, Justice Kapsner explained discussion of the issue was necessary 
because affirming the district court’s decision turned the statute of limita-
tions into a statute of repose.376  “A statute of limitation bars a right of 
action unless it is filed within a specified period of time after an injury 
occurs.”377  “A statute of repose terminates any right of action after a 
specific time has elapsed, regardless of whether or not there has as yet been 
an injury.”378  While agreeing that statutes of repose are not always uncon-
stitutional, the dissent reasoned that interpreting the statute of limitations as 
a statute of repose is contrary to the plain language of the statutes.379  To 
qualify as an aggrieved person under section 14-02.5-01(1) of the North 
Dakota Century Code, a person has to have been injured or has to foresee a 
future injury.380  The North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held the 
termination of a statute of repose is not contingent on whether a person had 
been injured.381  As a result, Justice Kapsner concluded the court’s prece-
dent and the plain language of the statute contradict one another as a result 
of the outcome of this case.382 
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JURISDICTION—N.D. SUPREME COURT—SUPERVISORY WRITS 
STATE V. LEE 
In State v. Lee,383 the State petitioned for a supervisory writ, asking the 
North Dakota Supreme Court to recognize a district court’s jurisdiction 
over a driving offense, which occurred within city limits.384  The supreme 
court granted the State’s petition and held the district court had jurisdiction 
over the driving offense.385 
A highway patrol officer stopped a driver for speeding within the city 
limits of Minot, North Dakota.386  The officer found the driver’s license had 
been suspended and charged the driver with driving while under suspen-
sion.387  The officer issued a citation for the offense, which stated the case 
would be heard in Ward County’s district court.388  However, although the 
driver pleaded guilty to the offense, the district court refused to accept the 
guilty plea.389  The district court explained because the offense occurred 
within the city limits of Minot, the case should have been brought in city 
court.390  Accordingly, the district court dismissed the charges against the 
driver.391 
The district court entered its written order dismissing the case against 
the driver on May 9, 2009.392  The State subsequently filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the district court denied on July 13, 2009.393  On 
July 20, 2009, the State filed a notice of appeal.394  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court asked the State to address the timeliness of its appeal.395  
The State conceded the appeal was untimely, but asked the supreme court to 
exercise its supervisory authority.396  A majority of the court agreed the use 
of the court’s discretionary supervisory authority was proper in this case.397 
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The majority explained the North Dakota Constitution and the North 
Dakota Century Code allow the supreme court to review a district court’s 
decision through the court’s supervisory authority.398  Supervisory writs, 
however, are to be exercised “rarely and cautiously”—only when no alter-
native remedy exists and when absolutely necessary to prevent injustice.399  
The court further explained supervisory writs “may be warranted when 
issues of vital concern regarding matters of important public interest are 
presented.”400  The issue whether a district court may hear state criminal 
matters that occurred within city limits, the majority concluded, was an 
issue of vital public concern, warranting the exercise of the court’s super-
visory authority.401 
In addressing whether a district court has jurisdiction over criminal 
offenses occurring within city limits, the supreme court first analyzed the 
authority of highway patrol officers.402  The court stated the authority of 
highway patrol officers is broad and includes the power to enforce those 
statutory provisions relating to the operation of motor vehicles and the use 
and protection of highways.403  In addition, the court noted the authority of 
highway patrol officers extends to all violations occurring upon the state’s 
highways.404  The term highway, the court explained, should be construed 
to include the streets and roads within city limits.405  Accordingly, the court 
concluded the statutory prohibition against driving under suspension “on a 
highway or on public or private areas to which the public has a right for 
access for vehicular use in this state” applied to driving on a street within 
city limits.406 
The supreme court then addressed whether the existence of a city ordi-
nance prohibiting driving under suspension superseded the application of 
state law.407  The court noted under section 12.1-01-05 of the North Dakota 
Century Code, “No offense defined in this title or elsewhere by law shall be 
superseded by any city or county ordinance, or city or county home rule 
charter, or by an ordinance pursuant to such a charter.”408  Thus, the court 
held even when a city enacts an ordinance under its home rule charter, all 
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399. Id. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. ¶ 7. 
402. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
403. Id. ¶ 9 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-03-09; 39-03-03 (2009)). 
404. Id. (citing Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207, ¶ 8, 743 N.W.2d 391, 396). 
405. Id. ¶ 10, 728 N.W.2d at 630. 
406. Id. ¶ 11 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-42(1)). 
407. Id. ¶ 12. 
408. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-05). 
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state criminal laws “remain in full force and effect within the city limits.”409  
The court determined because the statutory prohibition against driving un-
der suspension clearly applied to offenses committed within city limits, and 
because the highway patrol officer had the authority to enforce the statute 
within city limits, the district court had jurisdiction to hear the criminal 
matter.410  Therefore, the supreme court concluded the district court erred in 
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.411 
Justice Maring agreed with the majority’s holding that the district court 
had jurisdiction, but filed a dissent asserting the court should not have exer-
cised its supervisory authority in this case.412  In her opinion, the State had 
an adequate alternative remedy, which it failed to exercise, and, thus, the 
State’s petition for a supervisory writ should have been denied.413  Justice 
Maring rejected the State’s argument that as a result of its motion for 
reconsideration, the State missed the time to timely file an appeal and was, 
therefore, left with no adequate alternative remedy, warranting the issuance 
of a supervisory writ by the court.414  She explained the proper standard 
requires the court to consider whether an alternative remedy to bring the 
issue to the court exists, “not whether, due to tactical choices or procedural 
errors, the party has lost its right to bring an issue to this Court through an 
appeal . . . .”415  Justice Maring determined the State’s failure to bring the 
issue to the court through the appeal process was the direct result of the 
State’s tactical and procedural choices.416  Justice Maring concluded be-
cause an alternative remedy existed and the State could have brought the 
issue through an appeal, “the extraordinary remedy of issuing a supervisory 
writ” was not necessary, and the State’s petition for a supervisory writ 
should have been denied.417 
 
409. Id. (citing State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 24, 771 N.W.2d 267, 275-76). 
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412. Id. ¶ 17, 728 N.W.2d at 631 (Maring, J., dissenting). 
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417. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 
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SETTLEMENTS—BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS— 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 
DAVIDSON V. STATE 
In Davidson v. State,418 members of the Committee for Understanding 
and Respect (Committee) appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing 
their action against the State Board of Higher Education (Board).419  The 
district court dismissed the Committee’s attempt to enforce a settlement 
agreement against the Board and to enjoin the Board from “shortening the 
time period for the Spirit Lake Tribe and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to 
consider approving or rejecting [the] use of the ‘Fighting Sioux’ nickname 
and logo” by the University of North Dakota (UND).420  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding the settle-
ment agreement did not preclude UND or the Board from terminating the 
use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo before the two tribes had 
decided whether to approve or reject the use of the nickname and logo by 
UND.421 
In August 2005, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
prohibited its members from “using or displaying hostile and abusive racial 
or ethnic nicknames, mascots, or imagery at the NCAA championship 
events.”422  The NCAA identified UND’s use of the “Fighting Sioux” nick-
name and logo as prohibited under the NCAA’s newly adopted policy.423  
Opposing the policy, UND and the Board sued the NCAA in October 
2006.424  A year later, the parties entered into a settlement agreement.425  
The agreement specified UND and the Board would dismiss the suit against 
the NCAA and, in return, the NCAA would give UND until November 30, 
2010, to obtain permission from the North Dakota Sioux Tribes for UND’s 
use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.426 
 
418. 2010 ND 68, 781 N.W.2d 72. 
419. Davidson, ¶ 1. 
420. Id., 781 N.W.2d at 73. 
421. Id. ¶ 20, 781 N.W.2d at 78. 
422. Id. ¶ 2, 781 N.W.2d at 73. 
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424. Id. ¶ 3. 
425. Id. 
426. Id.  The North Dakota Sioux Tribes referred to in the settlement agreement were the 
Spirit Lake Tribe and the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Id.  UND was to secure the tribes’ “clear 
and affirmative support” in order to avoid application of the NCAA’s policy. Id.  The agreement 
further stated that “[i]f UND does not adopt a new nickname and logo, or if the transition to a new 
nickname and logo is not completed prior to August 15, 2011, then UND will be returned to the 
list of institutions subject to the Policy.” Id. ¶ 4. 
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In April, 2009, one of the two tribes, the Spirit Lake Tribe, agreed to 
permit UND’s continued use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.427  
In May 2009, however, the Board voted to retire the nickname and logo 
beginning October 1, 2009.428  The Board specified unless both tribes gave 
their approval for the continued use of the nickname and logo, UND would 
fully retire the name by August 1, 2010.429  As of October 1, 2009, the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe had neither granted nor denied UND permission 
to continue using the name and logo.430 
As a result, the Committee, which included members of the Spirit Lake 
Tribe, sought to enjoin the Board from retiring the “Fighting Sioux” 
nickname and logo before November 30, 2010, asserting such a termination 
violated the settlement agreement between the Board, UND, and the 
NCAA.431  The district court granted the Committee’s motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order.432  The Board challenged the Committee’s standing 
to seek enforcement of the settlement agreement and moved to dismiss the 
Committee’s complaint before filing an answer, arguing the Board had the 
authority to terminate the use of the nickname and logo before November 
30, 2010.433  After a hearing on the issue, the district court found the 
Committee had standing to sue, but dismissed the complaint against the 
Board because the court concluded the settlement agreement unambigu-
ously allowed the Board to terminate the use of the nickname and logo 
before November 30, 2010.434  The Committee appealed.435 
On appeal, the Committee argued under the plain and unambiguous 
language of the settlement agreement, the two tribes had until November 
30, 2010, to approve the use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo and 
any decision by the Board to retire the nickname and logo prior to that date 
constituted a breach of the agreement.436  Specifically, the Committee 
asserted, when considered in its entirety, the settlement agreement clearly 
intended to provide the two tribes with “a meaningful opportunity to dem-
onstrate ‘clear and affirmative support’ for the Fighting Sioux nickname 
and logo by precluding the Board from retiring the nickname and logo 
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before November 30, 2010.”437  The Board responded nothing in the lan-
guage of the settlement agreement required the Board to wait until 
November 30, 2010, before retiring the nickname and logo.438  The Board 
further contended “when read as a whole,” the agreement allowed UND to 
retire the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo and transition to a new 
nickname and logo at any time before November 30, 2010.439 
In addressing the parties’ arguments, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
first explained under Article VIII of the North Dakota Constitution, the 
Board has the authority to control and administer the State’s educational 
institutions, such as UND.440  The court then stated nothing in the language 
of the settlement agreement limited the Board’s constitutional authority or 
precluded the Board from retiring the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo 
before November 30, 2010.441  Moreover, although the settlement agree-
ment gave UND until November 30, 2010, to obtain the approval of the two 
tribes, the agreement did not require, and UND did not agree to, the con-
tinued use of the “Fighting Sioux” name and logo until that date.442  The 
court noted the settlement agreement allowed UND to retain the rights over 
the “Fighting Sioux” if UND chose to transition to a new nickname and 
logo on November 30, 2010, or at any time before November 30, 2010.443  
Accordingly, the court concluded, the plain and unambiguous language of 
the agreement should be construed to allow UND to retire the “Fighting 
Sioux” nickname and logo and transition to a new nickname and logo at any 
time before November 30, 2010.444  Therefore, the agreement did not 
provide the two tribes with the sole authority to determine the use of the 
“Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo and did not preclude the Board from 
terminating the usage of the nickname and logo before November 30, 
2010.445 
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